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Cloud Manufacturing is a manufacturing paradigm that focuses on collaboration and resource 
utilization. Until recently, little research has been done to combine the perspectives of cloud 
manufacturing and digital platform ecosystems. In the cloud manufacturing paradigm, the cloud 
coordinator takes up the dual role of a matchmaker and a platform owner, though, so it is interesting to 
research how any power dominance of the platform owner can be avoided. To do so, three dimensions 
of platform governance suggested by Tiwana 2014 – pricing policies, decision rights, and control – were 
considered in this contribution to recommend a fair value distribution mechanism for platform 
ecosystems in cloud manufacturing. Requirements for such a solution are formulated in this 
contribution and design patterns satisfying these requirements are derived. We propose using tokens 
administrated by distributed ledger technologies and smart contracts to enable a special split revenue 
scheme that satisfies the requirements for a fair value distribution and risk sharing within the 
contributing partners.  
Keywords cloud manufacturing, fair value distribution, platform ecosystem governance, design 
pattern 
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1 Introduction  
One aspect of the digital transformation of enterprises is to focus on the wishes of the customers even 
more than in the past (e.g., Gerster 2017; Reis et al. 2018). To be capable of reacting flexibly to 
customers’ preferences, enterprises adopt ideas of open innovation (cf. Chesbrough 2003) and customer 
co-creation (e.g., Reichwald and Piller 2009). This requires handling a plethora of individualized 
offerings and the capability to shift to complex mass customization with small series, not seldomly with 
batch size one (Lasi et al. 2014; Roth 2016). Concentrating on core competences (cf. Prahalad and Hamel 
1990), on the other hand, enterprises engage more in complex business ecosystems to cooperate in 
networks of value (Iansiti and Levien 2004; Moore 1993). For some scholars, customer centricity and 
customer co-creation result in a new service paradigm called service-dominant logic (e.g., Vargo and 
Lusch 2008), which means that enterprises always engage in value creation by offering services even 
when offering a product (good) as “goods are a distribution mechanism for service provision” (Vargo 
and Lusch 2008). Simply put, economics focuses on service provision, with product-focused industries 
increasingly changing their offerings and delivered services for their customers. One prominent example 
is Rolls Royce®’s Total Care® program and its to-the-point slogan “power by the hour.”1 Rolls Royce 
offers their engines as a pay-per-use service and improves maintenance and service time by using IoT 
technology and data science (cf. Choudhury and Mortleman 2018).  
Following these assumptions, mechanical engineering businesses (such as those from the metalworking 
industries) try to conceptualize machine offerings as a service on their customers’ shop floors.2 However, 
payment models such as pay-per-use mean that the customer’s entrepreneurial risk crosses over to the 
service provider insofar as the service provider suffers from low levels of capacity utilization but might 
not participate on high levels in the same relation. Thus, with offering pay-per-use models for machines, 
it is promising to regard the machine as an autonomous business unit and to enable it to offer its services 
on a larger market than a factory is. Cloud manufacturing (CM) conceptualizes such ideas (cf. Liu et al. 
2019) and was introduced in 2010 (cf. Li et al. 2010). The idea of CM is to share manufacturing 
resources, such as machines or software from different enterprises (providers), and orchestrate them by 
a cloud coordinator to fulfill customer requests. The cloud coordinator acts as a platform that 
coordinates multi-sided markets (cf. Boudreau and Hagiu 2008) by selecting and scheduling the 
contributing resources. The goal of CM is to increase the utilization of manufacturing resources by 
means of sharing and business collaboration (cf. Liu et al. 2019). The platform, providers and customers 
together form a complex digital business ecosystem (cf. Hein et al. 2020; Schreieck 2020).  
As a platform and market maker, the cloud coordinator is in a special position of power. Today, the 
majority of the world’s most valuable companies, including Alphabet, Alibaba, and Facebook, are based 
on platform business models. These models allow a wide variety of entities (e.g., service providers, 
customers, and complementors) to mutually interact and transact for value co-creation (Schreieck 
2020). The ecosystem participants have to be coordinated and regulated to generate collective value 
profitably and effectively. This task is performed by a matchmaker who forms the business platform. 
Such matchmakers are typically represented by one central platform owner, responsible for all 
regulation and coordination activities in the ecosystem. This platform owner exhibits a central position 
of power (Moazed and Johnson 2016).  
In a vast number of cases, such an archetype of an unbalanced power relation w.r.t. the platform owner 
and participants leads to an unfair and disproportionate value distribution (Mattila and Seppälä 2018). 
Platform owners regulate their platform to maximize their own profit and not primarily to maximize the 
value of the overall ecosystem (Boudreau and Hagiu 2008). Successful ecosystem management 
therefore poses two questions: 1) How can value be created that attracts participants to engage in value 
co-creation; and 2) How can value be fairly distributed (Iansiti and Levien 2004; Rong et al. 2015). Value 
distribution in CM is an open research issue (Adamson et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2019). Wu et al. (2013) raise 
unanswered questions associated with the cloud (platform) coordinator: namely, how can the 
coordinator decide between different providers and how can value be measured to be distributed fairly. 
To address such questions, we search for a CM ecosystem governance concept and design patterns 
supporting that concept. Thus, we raise two research questions: 
1) What are requirements for a CM ecosystem governance concept to enable a distribution of value 
fairly and according to the participants’ risk? 
                                               
1 https://www.rolls-royce.com/media/our-stories/discover/2017/totalcare.aspx 
2 We discuss such concepts with the R&D representatives of TRUMPF (https://www.trumpf.com) and FESTO 
(https://www.festo.com/group/en/cms/index.htm). 
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2) Which organizational and technical design patterns can be applied to conceptualize the CM 
ecosystem governance concept according to these requirements? 
The remainder of this contribution is organized as follows. The method section (section 2) reveals the 
research design, followed by the research problem and an elaboration of the requirements for the CM 
ecosystem governance concept (section 3). Section 4 presents design patterns which help to implement 
this governance concept. A conclusion with a discussion of limitations and future work completes this 
contribution (section 5). 
2 Method 
Striving for new business opportunities and transformational ideas, we approached representatives of 
the German machine manufacturers TRUMPF and FESTO to discuss a fair value distribution within 
manufacturing business ecosystems. In the future, we aim to develop an actionable governance concept 
enabling a fair value distribution in a platform-based CM ecosystem in cooperation with these partners 
through an Action Research (AR) approach (cf. Davison et al. 2012). 
AR “focuses on change through interventions in an organizational context and enables the generation of 
both practical and scholarly knowledge” (Davison et al. 2012: p. 764). It is iteratively conducted in a 
cyclic process of five phases: 1) diagnosing, in that the problem is specified; 2) action planning, in that 
alternative courses of action are deliberated on a theoretical basis; 3) action taking, in that one course 
of action is organizationally and technically implemented; 4) evaluating, in that the consequences of 
action are studied and assessed; and 5) specifying learning, in that the findings are presented to the 
scientific and the practical audience (cf. Baskerville 1999).  
This contribution expresses our focal theory for “action taking” (cf. Davison et al. 2012). Communicating 
this theory in advance of taking action is recommended to 1) inform the scientific community about the 
instruments for solving the identified problem; and 2) capture the theory explicitly for evaluating the 
instruments’ usefulness after taking action (Baskerville and Myers 2004).  
To develop the theory, we analyzed the literature to define requirements (section 3). To meet the 
requirements, we recommend design patterns elaborated in an argumentative-deductive approach (cf. 
Wilde and Hess 2007; section 4). 
3 Research Problem and Solution Requirements 
In this contribution, we research an ecosystem governance concept that enables a fair value distribution 
in CM platform ecosystems. Although CM is a well-researched concept with first implementations,3 little 
is known about CM business concepts. Despite obvious existing architectural and organizational 
similarities between cloud manufacturing and platform ecosystems, both perspectives have not yet been 
fused. This is surprising, as Liu et al. (2019) describe the CM operation model as follows: “manufacturing 
resource providers register their resources to a cloud platform and the platform operator manages and 
operates the platform for providing manufacturing services to consumers” (p. 862). Thus, the role of a 
platform and its operator in the sense of a multi-sided market maker is well recognized. The platform 
operator governs the ecosystem, formed by interactions of providers, the operator and consumers. 
Business ecosystem governance essentially involves how a platform owner influences its ecosystem and 
is a major aspect of the architectural design of platforms (Hein et al. 2020; Tiwana 2014). Parker and 
Van Alstyne (2018) define governance as a set of rules concerning who gets to participate in an 
ecosystem, how to divide the value, and how to resolve conflicts. Our research problem is to find a 
governance concept that prevents the dominance of the platform owner over the providers within the 
CM context. Hence, we search requirements for such a governance concept and corresponding design 
patterns for its implementation to enable fair value distribution and good incentivization for all 
contributors in the CM ecosystem. To identify these requirements, we analyzed literature about CM and 
platform governance. The derived requirements are presented below. 
3.1 Cloud Manufacturing 
CM is defined as a “model for enabling aggregation of distributed manufacturing resources (e.g. 
manufacturing software tools, manufacturing equipment, and manufacturing capabilities) and 
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable manufacturing 
services that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service 
                                               
3 For reviews, see Adamson et al. 2017; Liu et al. 2019; Wu et al. 2013 and also http://www.indics.com. 
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operator and provider interaction” (Liu et al. 2019). It transforms manufacturing from being product-
oriented to being service-oriented (Tao et al. 2011) and bundles resources of different organizations to 
dynamically compose service packages and bring them to the customer (Wu et al. 2013). The 
manufacturing cloud is controlled by a cloud operator who executes the governance system and has 
plenty of tasks, including task decomposition, searching, scheduling, invocation, or billing (cf. Adamson 
et al. 2017).  
Layer models (cf. Figure 1) clarify the CM architecture (e.g., Adamson et al. 2017). The resource layer 
consists of manufacturing resources, such as machines, but also software or knowledge (Zhang et al. 
2014). The perception layer abstracts these resources, enabling standardized communication with other 
components (Zhang et al. 2014). The service layer is responsible for describing the service, typically 
using semantic technologies such as the Resource Description Framework or ontologies (cf. Lu et al. 
2014; Zhang et al. 2012). International standards are developed to ensure interoperability (e.g., BMWi 
(ed.) 2020). Once the resources are virtualized and encapsulated in services by the service layer, the 
middleware layer orchestrates the service delivery for application (Zhang et al. 2014). This orchestration 
consists of functions such as transaction management, cooperation management, or billing. From our 
perspective, the functions of the middleware layer are the most relevant ones for the cloud operator. 
Requirement A-1: The governance concept and its design patterns should fit the architecture of CM.  
 
Figure 1: Cloud manufacturing architecture (with changes from Zhang et al. 2014) 
3.2 Platform Governance 
Tiwana (2014) proposes three dimensions of platform governance: pricing policies, decision rights, and 
control. As we aim to develop a platform governance concept, these dimensions guide us in structuring 
the concept. Following this, we derive further requirements for our concept from these dimensions. 
3.2.1 Pricing Policies 
Pricing policies define how the value created within the ecosystem is shared (Hein et al. 2020) as well 
as how and by whom prices are set (Schreieck et al. 2018). They describe the incentives that are used to 
attract the different market sides and encourage participation in the platform ecosystem (Tiwana 2014).  
CM follows the service paradigm and is customer-centric (Adamson et al. 2017; Li et al. 2010; Liu et al. 
2019). Thus, pricing changes to value propositioning and value is a collaborative process between 
providers and customers (Lusch et al. 2008). Moreover, an enterprise cannot deliver value but instead 
offers a value proposition, which the customer as co-creator can utilize to accomplish the value (Vargo 
and Lusch 2008). The beneficiary (customer) determines the value in the special context of co-creation 
phenomenologically and experimentally (Vargo and Lusch 2008). When the beneficiary co-determines 
the price of the co-created value, the strategy is called value-based pricing (cf. Cannon and Morgan 1991; 
Raja et al. 2020), which correlates positively with firm performance (Liozu and Hinterhuber 2013). 
Requirement PP-1: The pricing mechanism as part of the governance concept should support value-
based pricing.   
Wu et al. (2013) propose that all parties involved in a CM ecosystem must benefit from the venture and 
gain additional value by using CM. These authors call for a fair distribution of benefits as otherwise the 
contributors would not engage in the ecosystem further (Wu et al. 2013). The organization of such 
distribution is not discussed in the CM literature. Requirement PP-2: The value distribution 
mechanism as part of the governance concept should enable a fair value distribution for all contributors.  
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Fairness, in the sense of this contribution, means that contributors assess their input-outcome ratio 
against other contributors and feel fairness when the ratio of others is approximately the same. This idea 
of fairness expresses equity theory (Adams 1963). Individuals feel stress when input-outcome ratios are 
unequal and inequity exists (Huseman et al. 1987). Requirement PP-3: The distribution of value that 
the customer is willing to pay for should be in relation to the input of all contributors. 
Taking entrepreneurial risk is a prerequisite for engaging in a venture (Marshall and Ojiako 2015). CM 
aims to enable collaboration between businesses to increase the operating grade of manufacturing 
resources (Liu et al. 2019). When businesses collaborate, it seems fair to share entrepreneurial risk 
among the network of collaborators. Consider this example: Provider A delivers an axle, provider B a 
gear wheel, and the connection and packaging are provided by C. Hence, C orders from both A and B 
and pays both products. Irrespective of the risk that the customer will pay or is satisfied, C pays A and 
B. Thus, A and B do not share the risk of the entire venture, but C does. It appears fairer that all involved 
parties receive their share of value only after the entire job is completed. Requirement PP-4: Value 
should be distributed when the customer pays for the service, so that involved contributors share risk 
equally to their input ratio. 
3.2.2 Decision Rights 
Decision rights regulate the autonomy of entities, i.e., who is allowed to make which decisions (Tiwana 
2014). Keeping the discussed aspects of fairness in mind, an organizational setting that fosters fair 
decisions and hinders the power asymmetries of central platforms is required (Cutolo and Kenney 
2020). It is preferable for all contributors of the stable core of the ecosystem (cf. Mattila and Seppälä 
2018) to be involved in major decisions. Requirement DR-1: The platform owner, as a cloud operator, 
should be organized in such a way that all contributors of the ecosystem’s stable core are allowed to co-
decide. 
Entity autonomy refers to the degree of freedom actors have when co-creating value on the digital 
platform and can be either high or low (Hein et al. 2020). “High autonomy complementors refer to a 
loosely coupled relationship in which the complementor is independent and separate from the digital 
platform” while “low autonomy complementors are tightly coupled strategic partners in which both the 
platform owner and the complementor are mutually dependent and aligned” (Hein et al. 2020). As a 
product in a manufacturing context can only be created through the complex collaboration of the 
individual components, many machines as well as software or service suppliers are closely linked to the 
platform and therefore have a low autonomy in the platform ecosystem. Requirement DR-2: The 
organizational setting of the ecosystem should be one of rather tight coupling.  
3.2.3 Control Mechanisms 
Control mechanisms regulate the integration and orchestration of actors in the platform ecosystem 
(Tiwana 2014). Regulation shall incentivize and control the platform entities such that the highest 
possible value is generated (Talmar et al. 2018). De Reuver and Bouwman (2012) structure platform 
control into three types: authority-based, contract-based, and trust-based control. As the manufacturing 
resources in a CM setting originate from different companies offering complementary but also 
competing products and services, an authority-based approach is inappropriate. A purely trust-based 
mechanism built on confidence is too risky. A structure that uses negotiated agreements, such as 
contract-based control (De Reuver and Bouwman 2012), is the form to be aspired to. Contracts must 
include mechanisms to motivate and control participants in order to generate collaborative value. 
Depending on the organizational structure, the agreements must be flexible and adaptive in their 
conclusion and modification without incurring disproportionate transaction costs (Parker and Van 
Alstyne 2018). Requirement CM-1: The regulation of actors as part of the governance concept should 
rely on flexible contracts, which must not incur disproportionate and severe transaction costs.  
Gatekeeping is another control mechanism, regulating who participates under which conditions as well 
as which products and activities are granted, promoted, or punished (Tiwana 2014). It also includes IT 
use, which acts as a regulatory instrument but also in a self-regulating manner (Boudreau 2010). As the 
integration of a new machine or activity into the complex context of production cannot be assessed a 
priori, due to the heterogeneity of machines and unpredictable qualitative effects on the product, 
gatekeeping should be restrictive and subject to clear constraints. However, strict restrictions inhibit the 
ecosystem's ability to innovate, with a negative impact on value creation (Isckia et al. 2020). Hence, it 
is important to balance the ecosystem’s effectiveness and innovativeness. Requirement CM-2: 
Gatekeeping as part of the governance concept should balance restrictiveness and openness for 
innovation. 
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Table 1 shows the discussed requirements for the CM ecosystem governance concept. These 
requirements are rather abstract and derived from the starting point that value distribution within the 
ecosystem should be fair.  
 Requirements 
Architecture A-1: The governance concept and its design patterns should fit the architecture of CM. 
Pricing 
Policies 
PP-1: The pricing 
mechanism as 





PP-2: The value 
distribution 
mechanism as part of 
the governance 
concept should enable 
a fair value 




value that the 
customer is willing 
to pay for should 
be in relation to the 
input of all 
contributors. 
PP-4: Value should be 
distributed when the 
customer pays for the 
service, so that 
involved contributors 
share risk equally to 
their input ratio. 
Decision 
Rights 
DR-1: The platform owner, as a cloud operator, 
should be organized in such a way that all contributors 
of the ecosystem’s stable core are allowed to co-decide. 
DR-2: The organizational 
setting of the ecosystem should 
be one of rather tight coupling. 
Control 
Mechanisms 
CM-1: The regulation of actors as part of the 
governance concept should rely on flexible 
contracts, which must not incur 
disproportionate and severe transaction costs. 
CM-2: Gatekeeping as part of the 
governance concept should balance 
restrictiveness and openness for 
innovation. 
Table 1: Requirements for a CM ecosystem governance concept 
4 Design Patterns for the CM ecosystem governance 
To address the requirements, we argue for design patterns that help to implement the CM ecosystem 
governance concept. DR-1, DR-2 and CM-2 (see Table 1) are organizational requirements that affect the 
structural form of the platform owner and by whom the platform owner is represented. Hein et al. 
(2020) propose three different manifestations of platform ownership: 1) a single owner, 2) a consortium, 
or 3) a peer-to-peer community. A single owner is excluded on account of requirements DR-1 and PP-3. 
A pure peer-to-peer community does not fit with tight coupling (DR-2) and rather restrictive 
gatekeeping (CM-2). Also, knowledge and data protection issues within the production process are 
arguments against a peer-to-peer solution. Thus, the platform owner should be represented by a 
consortium that consists of a stable core of “insiders” in the ecosystem. Design pattern DP-1: The 
platform owner will be represented by a consortium of core contributors of the ecosystem 
(organizational pattern). 
Using Baran’s view of communication systems as a base (Baran 1964), Mattila and Seppälä (2018) 
differentiate the structure of decision rights from centralized over decentralized to distributed. We 
propose a decentralized decision rights structure that fits a consortium organization. The contributors 
must agree collectively on all major decision-relevant aspects, such as value distribution, offerings, or 
new members. These rules must be implemented (as far as possible) into a technical system that 
operates as a boundary resource (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013). Design pattern DP-2: The 
consortium will implement a decentralized decision rights system (organizational pattern).  
 
Figure 2: Exemplification of the fair value distribution concept 
Cloud operator
Customer
Asks for and specifies
product (e.g., CAD-file)(1)
Asks for service: axle, gear
wheel, connection, packaging
(2)
Offer input as share of total (3)
Assignment & smart 
contract activation
(4)
Smart contract distributes output w.r.t. input shares(7)
Offers product & 
negotiates price(5)
Pays X token into smart contract(6)
CM Contributors
A1: Axle è 35 %
B1: Gear wheel 
è 47 %
C1: Connection & 
packaging è 18%
A2 : Axle è 40%
A(n): Axle …
B(n): Gear wheel …
C(n): …
Smart contract
A1: X * 0.35
B1: X * 0.47
C1: X * 0.18
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PP-2 – PP-4 are key requirements for the fair value distribution. The contributors of any special output 
(service or good) negotiate how large the share of the output for each contributor is and set this in 
contracts. For example: Contributor A1 (axle) claims 35% of the share of the pay, B1 (gear wheel) claims 
47%, and C1 (connection and packaging) 18%. The contributors may be unaware of how much the 
customer is willing to pay at the time of agreement. They get the share they have agreed upon. Selecting 
contributors is done by the cloud operator. For that purpose, the cloud operator leverages an auction-
based mechanism to find a contributor for each task that has to be fulfilled and selects the one who is 
willing to accept the smallest share (Figure 2). Design pattern DP-3: Value distribution will focus on 
the value of input expressed as a share of a total. This input share will serve as the output share of the 
price the customer is willing to pay. The cloud operator ensures that the sum of shares does not exceed 
100% and uses an auction mechanism to determine the smallest sum of shares (organizational pattern). 
A sales function specialized to coordinate the customer wishes and to achieve a good price from the 
customer supports PP-1 as the price mechanism is not cost-oriented but the customer has a strong 
position in price discovery. The cloud coordinator is responsible for implementing this sales function. 
To meet requirement CM-1 and to be able to implement flexible contracts between the contributors, it 
is helpful to automate the negotiated contracts smartly. Therefore, the concept of smart contracts is 
promising (Szabo 1997). Smart contracts are legal agreements that make use of information technology 
to ensure their own enforceability and autonomously initiate actions that were previously contractually 
agreed upon (Cong and He 2019): for example, the release of an amount of money after a receipt of 
goods. In platform ecosystems, contract-based governance can be established through smart contracts. 
This can include different types of commitments, such as financial assets with a functional value, 
internal management, monitoring, allocation of outcomes, intellectual property, external relations, or 
conflict resolution. Value capture mechanisms can implement split revenue schemes in an equilateral 
manner and without monopolistic pricing structures by using smart contracts (Mattila and Seppälä 
2018). Design pattern DP-4: To implement the contract and consortium-based governance model 
and to enable split revenue schemes, smart contracts will be used as the technical base of contractual 
governance (technical pattern).  
DP-1 – DP-3 are design patterns that address the key dimensions of our CM ecosystem governance 
concept. The organizational design pattern DP-1 prevents the cloud operator from assuming a 
disproportionate position of power and is important for the fair value distribution as the platform owner 
has no incentive to optimize for its own profit (cf. Boudreau and Hagiu 2008). The organizational design 
pattern DP-2 enables a fair value distribution for the contributors and follows equity theory (e.g., Adams 
1963). The larger a contributor’s input proportion is, the higher is its entrepreneurial risk. Hence, its 
share of the output should also be proportionally higher. The scheme is fair according to equity theory 
and risk. The contributors are incentivized to perform well, as every contributor directly profits from 
customers being satisfied with the output. 
To support DP-2 technically, we propose the use of tokens. A token is a reference of any intrinsic or 
perceived value (Federal Ministry of Finance (ed.) 2019). It represents a generic and measurable unit of 
value closely connected to the rules of the network issuing it (Pazaitis et al. 2017). Tokens can perform 
governance functions in platform-based systems (such as the control functions of monetizing, 
resourcing, and securing) but also management functions such as attracting, sharing, and coordinating 
(Lipusch et al. 2019). This makes them suitable for our application context, both from a technical and 
an organizational perspective. The tokens serve as a means of payment within the CM ecosystem. Smart 
contracts administrate and distribute the tokens (accordant to DP-3). Design pattern DP-5: To share 
value according to the split revenue scheme, tokens will be implemented as a value reference managed 
by smart contracts (technical pattern). 
Pattern DP-3 allows the platform to be organizationally flexible and regulated by contracts. DP-4 allows 
for distributing the shares in a technically sound manner, administered by smart contracts. Both 
patterns describe technical approaches. Thus, smart contracts and tokens have to be embedded in a 
technology layer able to supervise these contracts and transactions. Distributed Ledger Technology 
(DLT) is able to supervise and validate transactions and to store them tamper-proof (Beck et al. 2018). 
DLT is able to build a ledger storing transactions with the following characteristics (cf. Heumüller and 
Richter 2018): 
• The ledger is replicated on different nodes and exists as long as at least one node is active. 
• The acceptance of transactions (validity) is confirmed by a decentralized (e.g., democratic) 
process between the nodes. 
• The sequence of transactions is unchangeable. 
• Transactions are protected against subsequent manipulations by cryptographic techniques. 
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To realize DLT, there are a multitude of different concepts (e.g., blockchains, or directed acyclic graphs) 
implemented by different designs (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, IOTA; cf. Kannengießer et al. 2019). Some 
designs are able to handle smart contracts, such as Ethereum4 or Hyperledger.5 With the support of 
DLT, smart contracts are supervised technically and provide greater contractual security than 
conventional contracts do. At the same time, smart contracts reduce transaction costs (Tönnissen and 
Teuteberg 2018). DLT has also gained attention for governing multi-sided platforms (Lipusch et al. 
2019; Mattila and Seppälä 2018). In these concepts, tokens play a central role for payment (Lipusch et 
al. 2019; Pazaitis et al. 2017). DLT is also proposed for CM management purposes (e.g., Angrish et al. 
2018). Design pattern DP-6: A DLT infrastructure capable of handling smart contracts will be 
implemented to support the concept of flexible contracts and consortium-based platform management 
(technical pattern).  
Table 2 summarizes the proposed design patterns which will be implemented to support our CM 
ecosystem governance concept that enables fair value distribution. 
Require-
ments Design Pattern 
DR-1, DR-2, 
CM-2 
DP-1: The platform owner will be represented by a consortium of core contributors 
of the ecosystem (organizational pattern). 
DR-1, DR-2, 
CM-2 
DP-2: The consortium will implement a decentralized decision rights system 
(organizational pattern). 
PP-2 – PP-4 DP-3: Value distribution will focus on the value of input expressed as a share of a 
total. This input share will serve as the output share of the price the customer is 
willing to pay. The cloud operator ensures that the sum of shares does not exceed 
100% and uses an auction mechanism to determine the smallest sum of shares 
(organizational pattern). 
CM-1 DP-4: To implement the contract and consortium-based governance model and to 
enable split revenue schemes, smart contracts will be used as the technical base of 
contractual governance (technical pattern). 
A1, DP-2 – 
DP-4 
DP-5: To share value according to the split revenue scheme, tokens will be 
implemented as a value reference managed by smart contracts (technical pattern). 
DP-3, DP-4 DP-6: A DLT infrastructure capable of handling smart contracts will be implemented 
to support the concept of flexible contracts and consortium-based platform 
management (technical pattern). 
Table 2: The design patterns supporting our CM ecosystem governance concept for fair 
value distribution 
Figure 3 depicts the integration of the CM ecosystem governance concept into the layer architecture of 
CM, using a schematic example. A customer asks the sales function for a service and suggests a price 
(application layer). This service has to be described semantically according to the CM standard. The 
sales function prepares a smart contract with the token amount proposed by the customer.6 The 
customer activates the smart contract by transferring the tokens. The coordinator distributes the 
customer request in the ecosystem and asks for offerings. The contributors (machine A, machine B, and 
the sales function) place their offerings (45%, 40%, and 10%) to the coordinator (middleware layer). The 
coordinator solves two problems for the customer by analyzing: 1) if the required resources are available 
on time (machines A and B can offer the service respectively); and 2) if the resource providers all 
together ask for an output share less than 100% (95% in the example, i.e., valid). Thus, the coordinator 
refines the smart contract, which encapsulates a distribution scheme with machine A getting 45%, 
machine B getting 40%, the sales function getting 10%, and the coordinator the remainder (5%). With 
the service delivery, the smart contract is fulfilled. The customer gets the service and the contributors 
the respective tokens. All ecosystem partners can benefit if ecosystem services become popular and 
valuable, as the reference value of the tokens will increase.  
                                               
4 https://ethereum.org/en/ 
5 https://www.hyperledger.org 
6 The customer can purchase tokens after an Initial Coin Offering via a token exchange (e.g., Lipusch et al. 2019; 
Richter and Heumüller 2020). 
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Figure 3: CM layer architecture integrating our fair value distribution concept 
5 Contribution and Limitations 
This contribution identifies design patterns to support the implementation of a CM ecosystem 
governance concept that focuses on fair value distribution and avoids power asymmetries within the 
ecosystem. To find these design patterns we analyzed requirements for the CM ecosystem governance 
concept according to the literature. All requirements can be implemented by different designs. We 
analyzed which design options fit best for our purposes. Thus, we propose three organizational and three 
technical design patterns for solving our problem. On the basis of the identified requirements, it 
becomes apparent that neither the platform operator nor any other participant may hold a monopolistic 
position. Instead, it must be possible to map decisions via collaborative distributed mechanisms. The 
proposed design patterns offer a template to these challenges and can help to implement an ecosystem 
that is perceived as fair by the actors involved in the value chain by leveraging innovative technologies 
and frameworks such as blockchains, smart contracts, or tokens. 
We suggest the platform owner to be represented by a consortium of core contributors of the ecosystem 
and to implement a decentralized decision rights system in that consortium. The value distribution 
within the ecosystem should be according to the input share a contributor offers and take place for all 
contributors when the customer pays the entire product. Smart contracts that handle tokens to realize 
the split revenue schemes within the ecosystem are suggested as technical design patterns. These smart 
contracts and the tokens should be implemented on the basis of a DLT infrastructure.  
These design patterns will serve as the focal theory (Davison et al. 2012) for the action-taking phase in 
our AR project with TRUMPF and FESTO. With these two practical partners we will implement the CM 
ecosystem governance concept and research the complex interactions within the ecosystem. The 
implementation will focus on small and medium-sized enterprises and foster the innovative power of 
these businesses.  
As with the majority of studies, the design of the current study is subject to limitations. Firstly, the 
concept is not implemented yet. The proposed novel technologies such as DLT or smart contracts have 
not yet been fully explored and are therefore not yet completely understood. Secondly, when the concept 
is implemented, it is vague as to whether and how potential contributors will adopt it. To understand 
the complex interdependence of technology and organizational behavior a priori is impossible, calling 
for a cyclical process of designing and implementation in an organizational environment (Sein et al. 
2011). However, this process starts in the action-taking phase based on this concept. Thirdly, the 
proposed ecosystem calls for standardized products that are easy to specify and easy to supervise in 
matters of quality. At best, the network forming ecosystem can be understood as a possibility for 
innovators to produce small series of new products without inducing fixed costs into their calculations. 
Lastly, the concept of a fair value distribution is not yet broadly discussed with practitioners, who 
ultimately are the potential implementors. Taking their comments and critique seriously is crucial for 
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